





















The (in)security of some recently proposed
lightweight key distribution schemes
Chris J. Mitchell




Two recently published papers propose some very simple key dis-
tribution schemes designed to enable two or more parties to establish
a shared secret key with the aid of a third party. Unfortunately, as we
show, most of the schemes are inherently insecure and all are incom-
pletely specified — moreover, claims that the schemes are inherently
lightweight are shown to be highly misleading.
1 Introduction
Two papers recently published by Harn et al. [6, 7] propose some very simple
key distribution schemes designed to enable two or more parties to establish
a shared secret key with the aid of a third party. Unfortunately, as we
show, most of the schemes are inherently insecure and all are incompletely
specified. Moreover, claims regarding the efficiency of the schemes, namely
that they are inherently lightweight, are shown to be highly misleading.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 provides an
introduction to the protocols in question, and sets them in the context of
the extensive prior art. This is followed by analyses of the various proposed
protocols: Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 provide analyses of the four protocols in the
first paper [6], and Section 7 briefly examines the almost identical protocols
in the second paper [7]. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Background
The two papers, whilst having very closely-related content and the same
set of authors, do not refer to each other, and it is hard to know which
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was submitted first. For simplicity we refer throughout to Paper A [6], and
Paper B [7]. Since the two schemes in Paper B [7] both appear to be slightly
elaborated versions of two of the schemes in Paper A [6], we consider Paper
A first.
2.1 Paper A
Paper A [6] presents a total of four closely related schemes, which we refer to
below as A1–A4. They all involve using a combination of a Key Derivation
Function (KDF) (see, for example, ISO/IEC 11770-6:2016 [10]) and pre-
established shared secret keys to establish new one-time session keys for
pairs or groups of participants.
All the schemes work in essentially the same way. Long-term secret keys
are first used to create one-time keys, using a KDF. The newly generated
one-time keys are then combined using bit-wise exclusive-or to create the
desired session keys. We provide details of the individual schemes below.
2.2 Paper B
Paper B [7] presents two schemes which also reply on KDFs and pre-established
shared secrets — we refer to these as B1 and B2. As we observe below, both
B1 and B2 are essentially the same as scheme A3.
2.3 Threat models
Neither of the two papers explicitly give the threat model in the context
of which the protocols are designed to operate. We therefore assume (as is
common practice — see, for example, Boyd et al. [2]) that messages are sent
between participants via an unreliable channel, i.e. one where an adversary
can eavesdrop on messages and also delete, modify or insert spurious mes-
sages. Of course, any such channel can be upgraded to a secure channel
using well-established technology such as TLS [15], but in such a case the
protocols described in the two papers would not be needed — keys could
simply be transferred in cleartext.
2.4 The prior art
There is a large and very well-established literature on protocols designed
to enable two parties to establish a shared secret session key with the aid
of a trusted third party with whom they both share a long-term secret key.
A classic example is that of Kerberos, whose design dates back to the mid-
1980s [12, 13, 16]. An extensive discussion of such protocols can be found
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in the landmark 1990s Handbook of Applied Cryptography [14], and the
first edition of a standard for secret-key-based key establishment protocols,
ISO/IEC 11770-2, was published in 1996 [8] — the current version of the
standard was published in 2018 [11]. For an up-to-date summary of the
state of the art, and a review of the history of the subject area, the reader
is referred to Chapter 3 of the excellent Boyd et al. [2].
Unfortunately, much of this prior art is either not known to the authors or
has been ignored. Certainly, no attempt has been made in either of Papers A
or B to provide a comparison of the efficiency and/or the security properties
of the proposed schemes with the prior art.
3 Scheme A1
3.1 Operation
The first scheme in Paper A ([6], §3.1) is designed to enable two parties (A
and B) to establish a shared secret session key, with the aid of a trusted
third party C. A and B both share a long-term secret key with C (which we
label LAC and LBC , respectively), although A and B do not, a priori, share
a key — explaining the role of C. Third party C is trusted to the extent
that it chooses the value of the secret session key to be shared by A and B.
All parties are also assumed to have access to a KDF f , the nature of which
is not precisely specified. For the purposes of this discussion, and in line
with common practice, we suppose that f takes two inputs, namely (a) a
secret key, and (b) some one-time data (which may be public), and outputs a
secret key (this is what is referred to in ISO/IEC 11770-6 as a key expansion
function). The nature of this function is also not specified, but typically it
is instantiated as a CBC-MAC, i.e. a Message Authentication Code based
on a block cipher in CBC mode (see, for example, ISO/IEC 9797-1 [9]).
It could also be instantiated using a cryptographic hash function, although
the computational complexity is likely to be very similar to use of a block
cipher. Most importantly, regardless of how it is implemented, it must be
computationally infeasible to recover the input secret key even if a number
of outputs are known. Note that all the schemes in both papers use such a
function f , and we implicitly assume throughout that this has been agreed
in advance.
The scheme has two phases.
1. In Phase 1, which is only briefly sketched in §3.1.2 of Paper A:
• A, B and C (by some unspecified means) agree on a public nonce
value N ;
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• A and C use a public nonce N and the KDF f to compute a
one-time shared secret key as KAC = f(LAC , N);
• B and C make an analogous calculation to compute a one-time
shared secret key as KBC = f(LBC , N).
It is implicit that N should be generated in such a way that it is only
ever used once.
2. In Phase 2, C chooses a one-time session key KAB to be shared by A
and B, which must have the same bit-length as KAC and KBC , and
distributes it to them both in the following way:
• C computes CA = KAB ⊕ KAC (where here and throughout ⊕
denotes bit-wise exclusive-or) and sends this value to A;
• A computes CA ⊕KAC = KAB to recover the session key;
• in parallel, C computes and sends CB = KAB ⊕KBC to B, who
can compute CB ⊕KBC = KAB .
That is, at the end of Phase 2, A and B will share the session key
KAB .
3.2 Efficiency and comparisons
The authors of Paper A make the following claims (see [6] §3.1.2).
The operation of this proposed scheme is lightweight since it only
needs to evaluate the positions of matching bits between two keys
which is equivalent to the computation of a logical exclusive or
(XOR) operation. In summary, the scheme is very efficient in
computation since logic XOR is the simplest operation and it is
also efficient in communication since it is non-interactive.
It is true that Phase 2 of the scheme does involve bit-wise exclusive-or oper-
ations. However, Phase 1 requires both A and B to compute the function f ,
i.e. to perform at least one block cipher encryption or hash function compu-
tation, which is nowhere near so lightweight as an XOR — typically, a hash
function computation is of the same order of complexity as a block cipher
encryption. The claim made in the paper is thus extremely misleading.
It is helpful to consider how the scheme compares with various well-established
protocols of this general type, i.e. in which a shared secret session key is es-
tablished between two parties with the help of a trusted third party, with
whom both parties share a long-term secret key. ISO/IEC 11770-2 [11]
specifies four protocols of this type, namely Mechanisms 7–10, which are re-
ferred to as Mechanisms using a Key Distribution Centre. These protocols
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have been extensively analysed over the 25 years since the standard first ap-
peared, and (after some minor modifications) there is now robust evidence
that they meet the claimed security properties (see, in particular, Cremers
and Horvat [3, 4]).
The four protocols have slightly varying security properties, and two of them
also include an optional step designed to enable A and or B to confirm
that their counterpart has successfully received the shared key. Since such
a property is not provided by scheme A1, we ignore the optional steps.
Table B.1 in Annex B of ISO/IEC 11770-2 [11] helpfully provides a detailed
comparison of the protocols, stating that all four protocols require A and
B to perform one encryption operation, with the exception of Mechanism
10 which requires one of the two parties to perform two such operations. A
superficial analysis therefore suggests that the complexity of these existing
standardised protocols is actually directly comparable with Scheme A1.
Finally note that, whilst I am not aware that the precise protocol has previ-
ously been proposed (there are so many possible variants), something rather
similar was proposed by Gong over 30 years ago [5]. It is interesting to note
that an issue was found with this latter scheme by Boyd and Mathuria in
1997 [1].
3.3 Security analysis
Unfortunately it appears that Scheme A1 is subject to a simple attack. We
sketch one possible attack scenario. The attack hinges on the fact that
there is no specified means for the parties to agree on who is involved in the
protocol at the beginning of Phase 1. We assume that the protocol set-up
(including setting up the nonce) takes place via a public channel, with no
protection for the exchanged messages; of course, such an exchange could
be made secure but this would require further use of cryptography, making
the protocol even less ‘lightweight’.
In line with the assumed threat model stated in Section 2.3, we suppose
that a malicious third party E can control the communications channel
with respect to a victim user A. We suppose that E convinces A that a
secret key is being established with party B (who is actually not involved).
The third party C believes it is establishing a secret key between A and
another (legitimate) party D. All active parties (i.e. A, C and D) agree on
the nonce N .
C computes a one-time key for A as KAC = f(LAC , N), chooses the session
key KAD and sends KAC ⊕ KAD to A (the malicious party E does not
interfere with this message). A can now also compute KAC and uses it
to recover KAD, which A believes is shared with B. Simultaneously C
computes a one-time key for D as KAD = f(LAC , N), and computes and
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sends KDC ⊕KAD to D; D now recovers KAD, which D (correctly) believes
is shared with A.
That is, at the end of the protocol A has a session key which it believes is
shared with B but is actually shared with D. This is clearly a breach of the
protocol objectives, especially if we observe that D could be the same as the
malicious entity E. Indeed, by repeating this deception with party B, E
could end up with session keys shared with A and B, which A and B believe
are shared by each other. This would enable E to act as an eavesdropping
‘man-in-the-middle’, reading messages sent between A and B which A and
B believe are securely encrypted.
There are a range of possible ‘fixes’ to the protocol. One possibility would
be to include the identifiers for A and B in the inputs to the KDF f , i.e.
so that one-time keys are computed as function of both a nonce and unique
identifiers for the parties involved. However, as is well-known, proposing ad
hoc fixes to protocols without providing rigorous evidence of security is a
dangerous path, and so even a fixed-up version should only be considered
for real-world use subject to the recommendations below.
3.4 Recommendations
If such a protocol is to be seriously considered for use then the following
points need to be addressed.
• Amodification to address possible attacks, such as that outlined above,
needs to be fully specified.
• A threat model needs to be carefully defined, and a formal security
model for the properties of the protocol needs to be given that matches
the threat model.
• A proof of security in the chosen security model needs to be given.
• A detailed performance and security comparison with existing proto-
cols, such as those specified in ISO/IEC 11770-2 [11] needs to be given,
so that any performance advantages over the prior art can be verified.
4 Scheme A2
4.1 Operation
This scheme is described in §3.2 of Paper A [6]. It is even simpler than
the first scheme. It simply describes how an entity A can be equipped by
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a trusted party S with a new secret session key, assuming A and S share a
long-term secret key, LAS say.
There are four steps (although the first two are only briefly sketched in §3.2.2
of Paper A).
1. A and S (by some unspecified means) agree on a public nonce value
N ;
2. A and S use the public nonce N and the KDF f to compute a one-time
shared secret key as KAS = f(LAS, N);
3. S chooses a one-time session key K to be shared by A and S, which
must have the same bit-length as KAS , computes CS = KAS ⊕K, and
sends this value to A;
4. A recovers K = CS ⊕KAS .
4.2 Efficiency and comparisons
Analogously to Scheme A1, the authors of Paper A make the following claims
([6], §3.2.2).
In summary, the scheme is very efficient in computation since it
needs only one logical XOR operation for both server and user
and is efficient in communication since it is non-interactive.
Just as for Scheme A1, the protocol requiresA and S to compute the function
f , i.e. at least one block cipher encryption or hash function computation,
which is nowhere near so lightweight as a single bit-wise XOR. The efficiency
claim is thus again extremely misleading.
Interestingly, steps 1 and 2 of the mechanism are essentially identical to the
steps in Key Establishment Mechanism 1 of ISO/IEC 11770-2 [11].
4.3 Security analysis and recommendations
As the standard makes clear, ISO/IEC 11770-2 Key establishment mecha-
nism 1 (which corresponds to steps 1 and 2 of Scheme A2) does not provide
authentication of the one-time key — i.e. of the key KAS using the above
notation. This is because there is no means provided for A and S to securely
agree on the value of the nonce N — moreover, CS is also not authenticated.
As a result, it follows that the session key K established by Scheme A2 is
not authenticated, i.e. it could even be the case that this key is known to a
party other than A or S.
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Therefore, unless additional mechanisms are put in place to guarantee the
timeliness and origin of the nonce C and the value CS , the mechanism
should not be used. A set of six mechanisms of this general type with well-
understood security properties are given in Clause 6 of ISO/IEC 11770-2
[11], and depending on the context and precise security requirements, one of
these should be used in preference to Scheme A2; that is, of course, unless
the communications channel is already made secure by other means.
5 Scheme A3
This slightly more complex scheme can be found in §3.3 of Paper A. It is
designed to enable a group of three or more users to establish a shared session
key using pre-established long-term shared secret keys. Two versions are
given: first a scheme designed specifically for three parties, and subsequently
a scheme for an arbitrary-sized group. We consider them in turn.
5.1 The three-party scheme
The scheme is a simple derivative of Scheme A1. The only difference is that
pre-established long-term secret keys are assumed to be shared by every
pair of the three parties (labeled A, B and C). These are then combined
with an agreed nonce using a KDF to generate three one-time shared secret
keys KAB, KAC and KBC (shared by A and B, A and C, and B and C,
respectively).
Any one of the parties, which we assume to be A (without loss of generality),
computes CA = KAB ⊕KAC and sends it to both B and C. Both B and C
can now recover the pair of keys (KAB , KAC) — which are also known to A
— and a combination of these two keys, e.g. using a KDF, forms the group
key.
Since it is essentially the same as Scheme A1 it suffers from the same serious
security issues. Moreover, while Paper A makes the usual claim about the
protocol being lightweight, its (hidden) dependence on use of the KDF for
every instance of the protocol means that this claim is highly misleading.
5.2 The multi-party version
This is an elaboration of the three-party version, which is only very briefly
sketched in §3.3.2 of Paper A. One of the parties is appointed as the initiator,
and somehow all of the n parties agree on the identity of the initiator and
a nonce. The initiator is also assumed to pre-share a long-term secret key
with all the other n − 1 parties. To start the protocol, one-time keys are
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generated as a function of the nonce and these long-term shared keys; as a
result the initiator will share a one-time secret key with every other party.
The n parties are assumed to be arranged in a binary tree, rooted at the
initiator (at the ‘top’ of the tree). The initiator then engages in a series of
instances of the three-party protocol, systematically working ‘down’ the tree,
at each stage establishing a group key shared by a larger set of participants.
Finally, when the ‘bottom’ of the tree is reached, all participants share a
single group key.
Since the three-party protocol suffers from the same major security issues as
Scheme A1, as discussed above, similar issues arise with the n-party version
of the scheme. Yet again the authors make the highly misleading claim that
‘the scheme is very efficient in computation since it requires only one logical
XOR operation for each user’.
6 Scheme A4
6.1 Goals of scheme
The final scheme is described in §3.4 of Paper A [6]. The scheme has the
same primary objective as the three-party version of Scheme A3, namely to
establish a shared group key amongst three parties (A, B and C) who have
pre-established long-term secret shared keys. However, one difference is that
this scheme is claimed to provide an authenticated group key, although what
this means, and the precise threat model, are left unspecified. However, it
is stated that the scheme ‘should be able to prevent any outside attacker to
impersonate to be any legitimate user and discover the group key’.
This implicitly means that the other three schemes are not authenticated
— indeed, this is clear from the analyses of Schemes A1–A3 above. It could
therefore be argued that to claim the previous schemes are insecure is unfair,
as they were not designed to be secure against active attackers. However,
the following points need to be taken into account when evaluating such an
argument.
• At no point in Paper A (or Paper B) is there any effort to make clear
that the schemes A1–A3 (and B1 and B2) are insecure and should
only be used when the communications channels are secure, e.g. using
an underlying protocol such as TLS. Indeed, the requirement for such
an underlying security protocol would completely invalidate any claims
about lightweight properties. Moreover, the authors state the following
in §3.1 of Paper A (this is the part of the paper describing Scheme A1
— the ‘basic scheme’ in the language used below).
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This basic scheme can be applied to many practical net-
work applications. For example, in a wireless sensor net-
work, each sensor has been pre-loaded with a subset of keys
before deploying sensors to a geographical area in a random
key distribution solution. After deploying these sensors, two
neighboring sensors intend to negotiate a common key be-
tween them to establish a secure communication. In order
to increase the probability of sharing an overlapping key in
two different subsets of sensors, researchers have proposed
various solutions. Our proposed key distribution scheme
provides an alternative solution for this application. In our
scheme, two sensors with no pre-shared key can establish
a one-time common key through a third sensor in which
both sensors have pre-shared keys with the third sensor sep-
arately.
This text clearly recommends use Scheme A1 directly, i.e. without any
additional security measures, over a wireless sensor network, where
such networks are likely to be deployed in an environment where in-
terception and manipulation of data transmissions will be feasible.
• Possible attacks on Scheme A4 are described below, which enables the
value of an agreed group key to be changed, i.e. so that one participant
ends up with a key different to that of the two other participants. That
is, despite being described as ‘authenticated’, the scheme does not offer
significantly more protection against malicious adversaries than any of
the other schemes.
• It is far from clear what the authors mean by ‘authenticated’ key
establishment; it would seem (see below) that the only additional se-
curity property for Scheme A4 is that it can detect if A and B send
inconsistent values to C.
6.2 Operation
As for the three-party variant of Scheme A3, it is assumed that pre-established
long-term secret keys are shared by every pair of the three parties. These
are then combined with an agreed nonce using a KDF to generate three one-
time shared secret keys KAB , KAC and KBC (shared by A and B, A and C,
and B and C, respectively). We suppose that the versions of the keys held
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protocol is designed to detect such inconsistencies.
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Two of the three parties now jointly act as protocol initiators (which, with-
out loss of generality, we assume are A and B). Both A and B now conduct
the three-party version of Scheme A3, which enables all parties to agree on










(using its copies of these two keys) and
sends it to C;





(again using its copies of these two
keys) and sends it to C;
• C computes K1 = CA ⊕ K
3
AC
and K2 = CB ⊕ K
3
BC
. If K1 = K2,
which should be true if all parties hold the same pre-shared keying
material, the same nonce, and all messages are exchanged correctly,
then C accepts K1 = K2 as the group key (as do A and B).
6.3 Analysis
As for the three previous schemes, §3.4.2 of Paper A makes a claim about
the efficiency of the scheme.
Each initiator needs to execute one logic XOR operation to com-
pute the positions of matching bits between two pairwise shared
keys and the third user needs to execute two XOR operations to
extract and compare a pairwise shared key which the user has
no prior knowledge of it. The overall performance of this scheme
is lightweight.
As in the previous cases, there is no mention of the cost of applying a KDF,
which means that the efficiency claims are highly misleading.
Even more seriously, the scheme is not significantly more secure than Schemes
A1 and A3, as somewhat analogous attacks apply. We sketch two possible
attack scenarios. In both cases, in line with the assumed threat model stated
in Section 2.3, we suppose that a malicious third party E can control the
communications channel with respect to a victim user C.
In the first attack, E first chooses a block of bits M of the same length as
the key KAB . E now modifies the messages sent from A to C and B to C
as follows:
• CA is replaced with CA ⊕M ; and
• CB is replaced with CB ⊕M .
It is not hard to see that C will compute K1 = K2 = KAB ⊕M . That is,
the value accepted by C will be different to the value held by A and B, i.e.
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the method does not provide key authentication as claimed. Of course, this
attack could probably be ‘fixed’ by providing explicit authentication for the
messages containing CA and CB , e.g. by adding a MAC to the two messages.
However, this would make the protocols much less efficient, voiding any
justification for departing from the well-established state of the art.
The second attack requires E to be able to manipulate the nonce value
agreed by the participants. This is a plausible assumption — there is cer-
tainly no discussion in either of the two papers on a secure method for
agreeing this nonce, and it is therefore reasonable to assume it is agreed by
insecure messaging (adding an exchange to agree the nonce in a secure way
would essentially require a security protocol to be run in advance of the one
proposed). By comparison, this issue is addressed in previously proposed
nonce-based protocols, by making the nonce exchange an explicit part of the
protocol. The attack proceeds in three stages.
1. Suppose E convinces A to run the protocol with itself and party C,
where A and E are the initiators and N is the nonce. Note that C is
not actually involved — E can send to A messages that are apparently
from C agreeing to use of the protocol, as required. Suppose also that
E intercepts the message CA = KAE ⊕ KAC sent from A to C (and
prevents it from reaching C). Since E knows KAE , E can now recover
the value of KAC for this value of the nonce N .
2. In a very similar way, E convinces B to run the protocol with itself
and party C, where B and E are the initiators and the value of N
is the nonce. Again C is not actually involved, and as previously we
suppose that E intercepts the message CB = KBE ⊕ KBC sent from
B to C (and also as in the previous step prevents it from reaching C).
Since E knows KBE , E can recover the value of KBC for this value of
the nonce N .
3. Finally, E persuades C to run the protocol with A and B, where A
and B are the initiators and the same value N is the nonce. The two
parties A and B are not actually involved, and E send messages to C
that are apparently from A and B, as necessary. E now chooses an
arbitrary key K∗ and sends both C∗
A
= KAC⊕K
∗ to C (impersonating
A), and C∗
B
= KBC ⊕ K
∗ to C (impersonating B), where KAC and
KBC are the values learnt from the first two steps of the attack. It
is straightforward to see that C will accept K∗ as a valid group key
shared with A and B, whereas in fact it is known to E (and not to A
and B).
It is important to note that no party is asked to use the same nonce value
twice, so even if all parties keep a record of all the nonce values they have
used (and refuse to reuse a value) the attack can still operate.
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7 Schemes B1 and B2
The schemes are essentially the same as Scheme A3 in Paper A, with some
slight variations in the wording. More precisely the schemes in Paper B have
the following relationship to the schemes in Paper A.
• Scheme B1 (given in §3 of Paper B) is precisely the same as the three-
party version of Scheme A1.
• Scheme B2 (described in §4 of Paper B) is a group key distribution
scheme and comes in two variants. The first variant (see §4.1 of Paper
B) involves multiple uses of Scheme A1, in a somewhat inefficient way.
The second variant (§4.2) is the same as the n-party variant of Scheme
A2, i.e. it involves use of a binary tree.
Just as in Paper A, claims are made about the efficiency of the schemes,
completely ignoring the fact that use of the scheme involves computing a
KDF.
8 Concluding remarks
We have analysed a range of key establishment schemes proposed in two
recent papers. There are a number of major issues with these schemes,
which we now summarise.
• The schemes have a range of serious security weaknesses, which poten-
tially allow active opponents of the protocols to learn keys that they
should not — this arises partly because at no point are the security
assumptions on which the protocols rest made clear.
• All the schemes are claimed to be highly efficient (‘lightweight’) since
they rely on computation of bit-wise exclusive-or operations to obtain
the session key. However, in no case is a reference made to the fact that
all the schemes require all parties to perform at least one key derivation
computation, the cost of which makes the schemes no more lightweight
than many rival schemes based on symmetric cryptography.
• Paper B is essentially a subset of paper A. Paper A does not refer to
Paper B and neither does Paper B refer to Paper A. It appears they
were submitted in parallel, although it is difficult to be sure since the
published version of Paper A does not disclose when the first version
was submitted.
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In conclusion, neither of the papers add anything significant to the literature,
especially as no attempt is made to compare the schemes to the prior art,
provide a detailed description of (let alone prove) their security properties,
or give a fair description of their computational complexity. Last but not
least the issues raised by publishing the same material twice merit careful
consideration.
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